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Changes in Indian Patent Law and 
Their Impact on AIDS Treatment in Africa 
By Pooja Van Dyck*
¶1 In March 2005, new patent laws were passed in India to comply with World Trade 
Organization (WTO) regulations and, specifically, the Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights Agreement.  These patent laws convey protections that are 
similar to a Western-style patent system.  India’s role as a supplier of inexpensive generic 
drugs to Africa gives its new laws impact far beyond the sub-continent.  The new laws 
will potentially limit the production and sale of inexpensive drugs treating acquired 
immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) in Africa.  The new system allows production of 
generic first-generation drugs.  However, it prevents the production of generic second-
generation drugs, which are important to AIDS patients who have become resistant to 
first-generation drugs. 
¶2 The AIDS crisis in Africa is reaching mammoth proportions — 25.8 of the 40.3 
million people infected worldwide live in sub-Saharan Africa.1  Although India’s new 
patent laws will likely have little positive impact on western pharmaceutical companies 
because there is little to no profit in the parts of Africa that are serviced by Indian 
pharmaceutical companies, the impact on the AIDS crisis in Africa has the potential to be 
devastating.  Therefore, these new laws produce tragic consequences with little benefit, 
except possibly to India’s developing pharmaceutical industry. 
¶3 This comment discusses the background and impacts of the new Indian patent law 
system.  The first section is a general introduction to the issue.  The second section 
outlines the current state of the AIDS crisis in Africa and India.  Section three discusses 
the background of international regulations and India’s changing patent system in 
response.  The fourth section discusses the impact on Indian pharmaceutical companies 
and AIDS in Africa of the new patent laws and potential solutions.  Finally, the last 
section concludes with the prospects for the response to the AIDS crisis given the new 
patent laws in India. 
 
* J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2007. 
1 Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS & World Health Organization, AIDS Epidemic 
Update: December 2005, 3 (Dec. 2005), http://www.unaids.org/epi/2005/doc/EPIupdate2005_pdf_en/epi-
update2005_en.pdf. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.  GATT, WTO, TRIPS, and the Doha Declaration 
¶4 In 1995, the WTO came into being through trade talks between the members of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).2  The GATT was an agreement 
between countries to regulate trade between nations by reducing tariffs.3  It had governed 
international trade since the end of World War II.4  However, GATT was not sufficient to 
cover modern international trade, and therefore, the international community created the 
WTO.  The GATT is part of the WTOs framework, but the WTO also created processes 
for problems that were not resolved under GATT.  5
¶5 The purpose of the WTO was to promote free trade, provide a forum to discuss new 
and existing trade rules, review trade policies of each member state periodically, and 
settle international trade disputes.6  Members can bring disputes to the WTO when they 
believe a country is violating the WTO rules.7  If the complaining party prevails and the 
country does not implement the WTOs recommendations, the WTO is authorized to 
allow the imposition of sanctions on the violating country.  8
¶6 The WTO oversees international intellectual property through an agreement 
entitled Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).  The TRIPS 
agreement established a uniform intellectual property standard in member states.9  The 
Council on TRIPS reviews the intellectual property laws of member states and 
determines TRIPS compliance.  The TRIPS agreement regulates how member countries 
deal with international intellectual property in the following areas:  
(1) application of basic principles of the trading system and other intellectual 
property agreements; 
(2) adequacy of protection of intellectual property agreements; 
(3) internal enforcement of intellectual property rights; 
(4) dispute resolution among WTO member states; and 
(5) transitional arrangements for new member states.  10
¶7 A country joining the WTO must bring its intellectual property laws into 
compliance with the TRIPS agreement.  For example, a patented invention must be given 
 
2 World Trade Organization, The GATT Years: From Havana to Marrakesh, 




6 World Trade Organization, What is the World Trade Organization?, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2007). 
7 World Trade Organization, WTO Agreements, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr03_e.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2007). 
8 Peggy B. Sherman & Ellwood F. Oakley, III, Pandemics and Panaceas: The World Trade 
Organization’s Efforts to Balance Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to AIDS Drugs, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 
353, 377-78 (2004). 
9 Id. at 361-62. 
10 World Trade Organization, Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2007). 
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20 years of protection.11  The end result is intellectual property protection in member 
states that is uniform and that closely reflects the type of intellectual property protection 
familiar in Western countries.12  If a country fails to comply, a dispute case may be 
brought and the WTO may sanction the failing country by allowing other countries to 
impose duties, taxes, and tariffs.  13
¶8 The WTO regulations grant a certain amount of time to comply with TRIPS 
depending on the state of development of each member country.  Developed countries 
have one year in which to comply.14  Developing countries have five years and least 
developed countries have 11 years.15  However, if a developing country has to radically 
alter its patent system because it provided no patent protection in a certain area, it has 10 
years to make the change.  16
¶9  In 2001, some member countries of the WTO met in Doha, Qatar, to discuss the 
intersection of patent rights with health crises.  They issued the Declaration on TRIPS 
and Public Health (Doha Declaration), which interpreted certain articles of TRIPS.17  The 
Doha Declaration stated that member countries had the right to issue compulsory licenses 
during a public health crisis while also recognizing the importance of intellectual 
property protection.18  The Doha Declaration is an intervention mechanism whose 
principle purpose is to lower the cost of critical drugs during a public health crisis.  
Although the Doha Declaration is an interpretive statement and changes none of the 
language of TRIPS, most countries have accepted its terms.  19
¶10 The Doha Agreement recognizes the rights of a member state to determine, under 
the member state’s own definition, that a public health crisis exists.20  It further allows 
the member state to issue compulsory licenses to pharmaceutical companies to produce 
patented drugs, without permission of the patent holder, where the patent holder does not 
sell or sells at an unaffordable price the designated drug in the member state.21  Some 
compensation is given to the patent holder, but the amount is determined by the state 
issuing the compulsory license.  22
¶11 Countries lacking the capability of manufacturing their own drugs for public health 
crises can employ parallel importation under the Doha Declaration.23  Parallel 
importation allows a state to buy pharmaceuticals from a cheaper source outside the 
 
11 Id.  Another requirement of TRIPS is that patents will be enforced through the legal system somehow. 
12 Id. 
13 Sherman & Oakley, supra note 8, at 377-78. 
14 See Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, supra note 10. 
15 Id.  This has been extended another 10 years for least developed countries to 2016. 
16 Id. 
17 World Trade Organization, Doha Declaration Explained, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dohaexplained_e.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2007). 
18 Id. 
19 Sherman & Oakley, supra note 8, at 380. 
20 World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2007). 
21 Sherman & Oakley, supra note 8, at 369. 
22 See Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, supra note 20. There is an obvious 
conflict of interest when a country using compulsory licenses in order to reduce the price of drugs is 
permitted to determine what compensation the patent holder will receive. 
23 World Trade Organization, TRIPS and Public Health: the Situation in 2005, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/health_background_e.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2007). 
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country and market them in direct competition with the patent holder at a much lower 
price.  24
¶12 The WTO regulations and TRIPS are the international agreements that regulate 
intellectual property rights.  These agreements require member states to change their 
patent systems to conform.  The Doha Declaration clarifies TRIPS to allow countries to 
use compulsory licenses to combat health crises. 
B.  India’s Generic Drug Industry and New Patent Laws Passed in 
Compliance with TRIPS 
¶13 India joined the WTO at its formation in 1995.25  However, at that time, India only 
provided protection of process patents for medicines.26  Process patents are patents that 
protect the method of making something, rather than the object or substance itself.  India 
had set up a weak system of patent protection in 1970 in order to foster a domestic drug 
industry.27  Therefore, India needed to radically amend its patent system to protect 
product patents and was given the 10-year compliance period ending in January 2005.  
Because India only protected process patents, before 1995, pharmaceutical companies to 
easily alter a step in the process and produce drugs without violating the patents.28  
Therefore, India had a flourishing generic drug industry because copying process-patent 
drugs could be done within the law.   
¶14 Today, this generic pharmaceutical industry produces inexpensive drugs for India 
and Africa.  For example, in Africa, generic AIDS drugs produced by Indian companies 
are $20 per month, whereas non-generic drugs, produced by the patent holder or licensee, 
are $395 per month.29  This reduced cost makes AIDS drugs more widely available to 
people in Africa.30  However, in order to comply with TRIPS, India made a series of 
changes to its patent system to protect product patents.  These changes have the potential 
to be detrimental to the response to the AIDS crisis in Africa.   
¶15 The latest change to the Indian patent system was made in March 2005 and brought 
India into full compliance with TRIPS.31  The change allows Indian pharmaceutical 
companies to continue to manufacture generic drugs that were in production prior to 
1995, but prevents them from applying process changes to drugs that were patented after 
1995.  The new laws effectively shut down the Indian generic drug industry for all drugs 
patented after 1995. 
 
24 Sherman & Oakley, supra note 8, at 372-73.  This phenomenon has recently been a controversial 
subject in the U.S. with people ordering drugs from Canada where prices are much lower. 
25 World Trade Organization, India and the WTO, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/india_e.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2007). 
26 Although this sounds unusual, other countries did the same at the time.  See Suresh Koshy, Note, The 
Effects of TRIPs on Indian Patent Law: A Pharmaceutical Industry Perspective, 1 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 
4, ¶ 14 (1995). 
27 Sherman & Oakley, supra note 8, at 381. 
28 See Koshy, supra note 26, ¶ 21. 
29 Global, AIDS POL’Y LAW, Apr. 8, 2005. 
30 Brook K. Baker, Arthritic Flexibilities for Accessing Medicines: Analysis of WTO Action Regarding 
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 14 IND. INT’L. & COMP. 
L. REV. 613, 615 (2004). 
31 Compliance also requires patents to be enforced; however, India’s legal system is slow and 
backlogged.  Therefore, enforcement of patents may be a problem despite the new patent laws. 
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¶16 This prohibition has a special impact on AIDS treatment because of the nature of 
the virus.  A patient with AIDS can develop resistance to a course of treatment with first-
generation drugs even when taken properly.32  New drugs must then be developed to 
respond to the mutated strains — the second- and third-generation drugs.  It is this class 
of drugs, developed and patented post-1995, that fall under the new Indian patent laws.  
While the Indian process-pharmaceutical industry can continue its manufacture of first-
generation drugs, patients who require second-generation therapy are forced to meet 
much higher prices for these drugs, which are now protected from process changes 
prohibited by the new Indian patent law that responds to TRIPS requirements.  These 
drugs can be up to 50 times more expensive.  33
II.  AIDS: AFRICA AND INDIA 
¶17 In Africa, AIDS is spreading at alarming rates.  More people need drugs to live 
with AIDS.  In sub-Saharan Africa, the infection rate is 7.2 percent.34  The next highest 
infection rate of 1.6 percent is in the Caribbean.35  Of the approximately 40.3 million 
people living with AIDS worldwide, 25.8 million live in sub-Saharan Africa (this is 
approximately two-thirds of all AIDS cases).36  In 2005, there were approximately 3.1 
million deaths worldwide from AIDS, with 2.4 million in Africa alone.37  “At best one in 
ten Africans … in need of antiretroviral treatment were receiving it in mid 2005.”  38
¶18 The United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS and the World Health Organization 
stated that “sustained progress in the response against AIDS will only be attained by 
intensifying HIV prevention and treatment simultaneously.”39  Fifty-five percent of future 
infections expected to occur until 2020 could be prevented with a prevention and 
treatment plan.40  The situation in Africa is dire, and world organizations are calling for 
provision of more treatment to AIDS patients in Africa.41  Any reduction in available 
treatment would significantly impact people living with AIDS.  Success of treatment 
programs also depends on the availability of second-generation drugs.   
¶19 AIDS in India is also a major problem.  In 2003, 5.1 million people were living 
with HIV in India and the numbers are increasing.42  Approximately 12.6 percent of the 
globally infected population resides in India.43  These statistics show there is a need for 
inexpensive AIDS drugs and the need is increasing. 
 
32 Press Release, Doctors Without Borders, As WHO and UNAIDS Call For Global Treatment Scale-
Up, MSF Asks: Where Will the Essential Drugs Come From? (Mar. 28, 2006), available at: 
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/pr/2006/03-28-2006.cfm. 
33 Press Release, Doctors Without Borders, People Not Getting Treatment They Need to Stay Alive 
(Nov. 29, 2006), available at: http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/pr/2006/11-29-2006.cfm. 
34 See Epidemic Update: December 2005, supra note 1, at 4. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 3. 
37 Id. at 2. 
38 Id. at 5. 
39 Id. at 7. 
40 See Epidemic Update: December 2005, supra note 1, at 7. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 33. 
43 Id. 
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III.  INDIA’S PATENT SYSTEM, EARLY STAGES AND CHANGES TO COMPLY 
WITH WTO AND TRIPS 
¶20 This section discusses the Indian pharmaceutical industry and the evolution of the 
Indian patent system from inception to recent changes for compliance with TRIPS.  India 
joined the WTO in 1995 and had to change many of its laws in order to comply with 
WTO regulations, including TRIPS.  This section also discusses the details of TRIPS and 
the Doha Declaration.  The new patent laws in India allow continued limited generic drug 
production under certain circumstances in light of the Doha Declaration. 
A.  Early Development of India’s Patent System and 
the Pharmaceutical Industry — Pre-WTO 
¶21 India’s patent system began in 1856 with the granting of exclusive rights for a 
period of 14 years.44  India created its modern patent system in 1970 by passing the 
Patents Act.45  It granted patent protection for process patents and specifically excluded 
product patents for medicine.46  Granted patents conferred rights for a period of 14 
years.   Further, the patent must have been worked within India to receive protection;47 48 a 
patent would not have been granted for a solely imported product.49  The Patents Act 
contains a section allowing a compulsory license for a “patented invention not available 
to the public at a reasonable price.”50  This section is in force today, potentially allowing 
the Indian government to issue compulsory drug licenses for domestic health crises. 
¶22 The Indian government created this patent system to cultivate a domestic 
pharmaceutical industry.51  At the time of passage, India had very high drug prices and 
foreign companies owned most of the patents.52  India created the protectionist system to 
foster domestic industry, promote import substitution, and reduce prices.53  This patent 
system created a flourishing domestic generic pharmaceutical industry because drug 
product patents were not allowed and patented processes could easily be altered, thereby 
losing their patent protection. 
¶23 As a result of this patent regime, India is currently a major exporter of generic 
AIDS drugs to African countries suffering from the AIDS crisis.  Not only did Indian 
pharmaceutical companies benefit from Indian law during its developmental stages, 
citizens of African countries benefited as well.  Indian generic AIDS drugs were available 
for $20 per month, whereas Western pharmaceutical companies charged $395 per 
 
44 Government of India Office of the Controller General of Patents, History of the India Patent System, 
http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/history.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2006). This system was based on the British 
Patent Law of 1852. 
45 Id. 
46 Koshy, supra note 26. 
47 Id. at 8. 
48 Id. at 10.  “Worked” means the process must be implemented or used in India.  Patents that were 
“worked” in foreign countries did not garner patent protection.   
49 Id. 
50 The Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970; India Code (1999), § 84(5), available at 
http://www.patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/patAct1970-3-99.html. 
51 Id. at 12. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
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month.54  Also, Indian companies were able to bring together various AIDS drugs, each 
owned by a different Western pharmaceutical company, and combine them into one 
pill.55  This made taking the medication much easier, especially for those Africans who 
are poor or uneducated. 
B.  TRIPS and the Doha Declaration 
¶24 The TRIPS agreement was part of the original agreement establishing the WTO 
and was signed in 1994.56  It represented an acknowledgement of the importance of 
protecting intellectual property and of the role intellectual property plays in furthering 
economic development.57  The international community and future WTO members 
created TRIPS to reduce impediments to trade while considering the technological needs 
of least-developed countries.  58
¶25 The TRIPS agreement requires certain patent protection for member states, such as 
patent life of 20 years, equal treatment for all member states, and patent protection for 
both processes and products.59  However, TRIPS also provides exceptions to full 
protection for patents.  In article 27 of TRIPS, a government is allowed to exclude 
inventions from full patent protection that protect human life or health.  60
¶26 Further, Article 31, titled “Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder,” 
allows governments to grant compulsory licenses.61  It states, “[w]here the law of a 
Member allows for other use of the subject matter of a patent without the authorization of 
the right holder, including use by the government or third parties authorized by the 
government,” compulsory licenses may be granted according to certain provisions.62  It 
also requires notification to the patent holder, although this may be waived during 
emergencies,63  and compensation to the patent holder to be determined by the issuing 
government.   However, products of such licenses must be used predominantly in the 64
 
54 See Global, supra note 29. 
55 This was something Western pharmaceuticals had not done, probably because of the cost of 
negotiating with all the patent owners. 
56 World Trade Organization, Overview: the TRIPS Agreement, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2007). 
57 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit 
Goods, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal 
Instruments — Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 81, 84 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
58 Id. 
59 See Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, supra note 10. 
60 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 57, art. 27.2 (“Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the 
prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect public 
order or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to 
the environment, provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is prohibited by 
their law.”); see Nabila Ansari, International Patent Rights in a Post-Doha World, 11 CURRENTS: INT’L 
TRADE L.J. 57 (2002). 
61 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 57, art. 31. 
62 Id.  Although Article 31 does not use the term “compulsory licensing,” this is how it has been 
interpreted.  See Sara M. Ford, Comment, Compulsory Licensing Provisions Under the TRIPs Agreement: 
Balancing Pills and Patents, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 941 (2000); Susan V. Vaughan, Note, Compulsory 
Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Under TRIPS: What Standard of Compensation?, 25 HASTINGS INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 87 (2001) (discussing compulsory licensing). 
63 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 57, art. 31(b). 
64 Id. art. 31(j). 
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domestic market.65  These articles were interpreted in the Doha Declaration on TRIPS 
and Public Health to clarify the use of compulsory licenses during health crises. 
¶27 The Declaration stated that the TRIPS agreement included flexibilities when it 
comes to public health.   Those flexibilities were:  66
(a) In applying the customary rules of interpretation of public international law, 
each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the object 
and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives and 
principles. (b) Each Member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the 
freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted. (c) Each 
Member has the right to determine what constitutes a national emergency or 
other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that public health 
crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other 
epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme 
urgency.67
Therefore, governments may grant compulsory licenses for public health problems they 
determine are of “extreme urgency” or “national emergency,” in addition to the 
recognized epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. 
¶28 There has been some debate as to what constitutes an “extreme urgency” or 
“national emergency,” but this subject is beyond the scope of this paper.  The AIDS 
epidemic is an internationally-recognized crisis.  The Declaration left open for debate the 
problem of countries that have little or no infrastructure to produce their own drugs under 
compulsory licenses.  Specifically, paragraph 6 of the Declaration stated: 
We recognize that WTO members with insufficient or no manufacturing 
capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective 
use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement.  We instruct the 
Council for TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to this problem and to report to 
the General Council before the end of 2002.68
¶29 In August 2003, in response to the open question in paragraph 6, the WTO agreed 
on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and Public Health.69  The WTO implemented a process by which least developed 
countries could import generic drugs produced under compulsory licenses in other 
countries.70  The first step in this process was to determine whether the least developed 
country had insufficient or no infrastructure to produce the drug.   Then, the process 71
 
65 Id. art. 31(f). 
66 World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, ¶4, 
WT/MIN(01)/Dec/2, (Nov. 14, 2001), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.pdf. 
67 Id. ¶5. 
68 Id. ¶6. 
69 World Trade Organization, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 (Aug. 30, 2003), 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. Annex. 
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required the least developed country to issue a compulsory license and report expected 
quantities to the Council for TRIPS.72  Finally, the exporting country must issue a 
compulsory license and produce only the reported quantities.  73
¶30 Therefore, under TRIPS and in light of the Doha Declaration, an exporting country, 
like India, may continue to produce generic drugs under certain conditions.  These 
conditions are reasonable for stable importing governments; however there are some 
African countries where the government does not have the stability or political will to go 
through the process. 
C.  India Joins the WTO and Changes its Patent Laws 
¶31 In 1995, India joined the WTO in order to enter the global marketplace.  The WTO 
encourages and protects trade between member states by limiting import bans and quotas, 
reducing custom duties, and creating most-favored-nation treatment with other 
members.74  India began passing various amendments to the Patents Act to comply with 
WTO regulations.  In 1999, India passed the Patents (Amendment) Act, 1999.  It allowed 
patenting of inventions not worked in India, thereby creating patent protection for foreign 
inventions.75  It further clarified that patents granted an exclusive “right to sell and 
distribute.”    76
¶32 The 1999 amendment created a separate category for pharmaceutical patents called 
Exclusive Marketing Rights.77  This category allowed protection for new medicines, but 
exempted drugs that were already in the public domain of India.78  The amendment 
created a “mail box” for applications.  This “mail box” would put a hold on all product 
patent applications from 1995 to 2005.  After 2005, India would process the “mail box” 
product patents in compliance with TRIPS.  This was an interim measure enacted to 
confer full patent protection to drugs invented after 1995 while India modified its patent 
system.  In 2002, India passed the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002.  It extended the 
patent grant from 14 years to 20 years and reflected other changes to the Indian patent 
system as required when it joined the Patent Cooperation Treaty.79  It also clarified the 
ability to patent biochemical and biological processes.    80
¶33 The last amendment to the Indian Patents Act was passed in 2005.  This 
amendment finally removed the language prohibiting medicine product patents and the 
special category of Exclusive Marketing Rights for medicine patents created in the 1999 
amendment.81  This amendment ended the “mail box” system because drugs could now 
receive product patents.  The amendment also included language about compulsory 
 
72 Id. ¶2. 
73 Id. 
74 World Trade Organization, Principles of the Trading System, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2007). 
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licensing for export.82  This compulsory licensing section mimicked the language adopted 
by the WTO in August 2003 in the Doha Declaration.83  These amendments brought 
India’s patent system into compliance with TRIPS. 
¶34 India’s pharmaceutical industry flourished under the previous weak patent system; 
however, it had been limited to a generic pharmaceutical industry for the very same 
reason.  The industry could not only evade the process patents legally, it also did not have 
to worry about being sued for violating patents because of the laws and the sluggishness 
of the Indian legal system.  84
¶35 Today, India’s domestic pharmaceutical industry controls most of the domestic 
market and its generic drug industry is a global competitor.85  Some of its facilities are 
inspected by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and it exports drugs to the U.S. and 
Canada.86  However, Indian pharmaceutical companies have not invested in research and 
development because of the lax patent system.87  Therefore, the industry will take some 
time before it can produce drugs of its own invention.  But, given the new patent laws, 
the high cost of drugs in the West could be lowered by outsourcing pharmaceutical 
production to India because of its modern pharmaceutical facilities and inexpensive labor 
force. 
IV.  THE FUTURE OF INDIA’S PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY AND AIDS IN AFRICA 
¶36 This section discusses the impacts of the changes in the patent system and the 
potential response to the problem.  Section A describes the changes to the Indian 
pharmaceutical industry and the AIDS crisis.  Section B focuses on the process and 
problems of supplying drugs to Africa through TRIPS.  The industry can continue to 
supply Africa until people require new, patented drugs.  At that point, India must decide 
whether to follow the process outlined in its laws and TRIPS to produce second 
generation drugs.  If India does not produce these drugs, the AIDS crisis in Africa may 
worsen.  Section C discusses alternative solutions to this problem. 
A.  Impacts of Changes in Patent Law 
¶37 The current patent law system in India could endanger the export of AIDS drugs to 
Africa.  The current or first-generation AIDS drugs that India currently exports to Africa 
were grandfathered-in by the amendments to the Patents Act.88  This means Indian 
generic pharmaceutical producers can continue to produce and export current generic 
AIDS drugs to Africa with no bureaucracy involved.  However, as people become 
resistant to first-generation drugs, second generation drugs will not be as readily 
 
82 The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 15 of 2005; India Code (2005), Sec. 92A, available at 
http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/patent_2005.pdf. 
83 See Id.; see also Implementation of Paragraph 6, supra note 69, ¶¶ 1, 2a. 
84 Stephen Barnes, Note, Pharmaceutical Patents and TRIPS: A Comparison of India and South Africa, 
91 KY. L.J. 911, 924 (2003). 
85 Id. 
86 Sreenivasarao Vepachedu & Martha M. Rumore, Patent Protection and the Pharmaceutical Industry 
in the Indian Union, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Oct. 2004. 
87 Barnes, supra note 84, at 926. 
88 See Sherman & Oakley, supra note 8, at 387. 
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available, or at all, because they have protection under the new system.  The new patent 
system requires substantial government intervention before an Indian pharmaceutical 
company can export second-generation generic AIDS drugs to Africa. 
¶38 The new patent system also creates incentives for Indian pharmaceutical companies 
to invest in research and development because it now provides product protection to new 
drugs.  The Indian market is growing and will be a lucrative market for new drugs.  
Further, Western pharmaceutical companies have not been focusing on diseases in India.  
Therefore, Indian pharmaceutical companies can create new drugs in a growing market 
and be assured of protection for their investment. 
¶39 The changes in Indian patent law potentially affect the future of the AIDS crisis in 
Africa.  Although first generation generic drugs will still be available cheaply despite the 
changes in the patent system, Indian pharmaceutical companies cannot produce second 
generation drugs without substantial government intervention.  African countries have the 
legal right to produce generic drugs under compulsory licenses for their AIDS crises.  
However, most of them do not have the resources to create a domestic generic 
pharmaceutical industry; instead, these countries will have to resort to the cumbersome 
TRIPS procedures. 
B.  Supplying Second-Generation Drugs to Africa Through the TRIPS Process 
¶40 To request generic drugs from India, an African country must submit a report of the 
type of drug and its quantity to the Council of TRIPS, establish that it has insufficient or 
no manufacturing capabilities, and grant a compulsory license to a pharmaceutical 
company.89  Then, India has to grant its own compulsory license, produce only the 
amounts requested, and label the product as produced as part of this request.90  Further, 
both exporting and importing countries have to compensate the patent holder.91  The 
importing African country must ensure that the drugs it receives through such requests 
are not used for other purposes or exported to other countries.    92
¶41 Although this process sounds straightforward, there are problems with requiring a 
poor country that cannot afford non-generic medicines to ensure that the medicine is not 
exported.  Countries with no manufacturing capabilities are unlikely to have the 
infrastructure or resources to seal its borders.  As of the date of this paper, no countries 
have requested importation or exportation of drugs produced under compulsory licenses 
through the TRIPS process.93  Therefore, there is no evidence of whether the TRIPS 
process is feasible for both importing and exporting countries. 
¶42 Once India’s pharmaceutical companies begin competing on a global level with 
patented drugs of their own, what incentives do they have to produce low-priced drugs 
for Africa?  Additionally, Indian pharmaceutical companies may not have the high profits 
that Western companies do.  Exporting new drugs to the lucrative Western market for 
higher profits may use resources of Indian pharmaceutical companies that will no longer 
be available to manufacture AIDS drugs for Africa.  In addition, Indian companies may 
 
89 See Implementation of Paragraph 6, supra note 69, ¶ 2. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. ¶3. 
92 Id. ¶4. 
93 World Trade Organization, Notifications by Importing WTO Members, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_notif_import_e.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2006). 
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begin research and development on diseases found in India that are not researched by 
Western companies.  These new drugs may divert resources that could have been used to 
produce generic AIDS drugs (e.g., manufacturing plants, workers, etc.). 
¶43 Furthermore, working within the framework of the WTO would mean more 
bureaucracy for the Indian government.  Besides the problem of its slow-working nature 
and miles of red-tape, the Indian government may be reluctant to issue compulsory 
licenses because of the potential for dispute cases.  In addition, the Indian government 
may want to encourage foreign investment and may not be willing, from a political 
standpoint, to use compulsory licenses for products from potential investors. 
¶44 With respect to the African side of the equation, many African countries have 
unstable or ruthless governments that may not follow the process laid out by the WTO.  
People in these countries may continue to suffer even if drugs are available for people in 
other countries whose governments are willing to use the TRIPS process.  The WTO 
process for exporting generic drugs does not seem to allow for non-governmental 
organizations to request and distribute the drugs. 
¶45 On the other hand, Indian pharmaceutical companies may choose to produce AIDS 
drugs in violation of patents.  Fear of the Indian legal system may not be much of a 
deterrent to Indian companies because of the back-log and lengthy case time.94  
Therefore, Indian companies that are violating patents may be shielded from suit within 
the country from Western pharmaceutical patent holders.  Patent holders would have to 
bring suit against the Indian government for violation of patents through the WTO 
settlement process.  This process requires the company’s home country government to 
bring the suit to the WTO.  For U.S. pharmaceutical companies, this means working with 
different administrations with varying levels of interest in participating in international 
institutions.  95
¶46 Therefore, continued Indian production of generic AIDS drugs is not a guaranteed 
solution to the crisis in Africa. 
C.  Other Solutions to Africa’s AIDS Problem 
¶47 If India stops producing AIDS drugs for Africa beyond the first-generation drugs, 
the situation in Africa will further deteriorate unless another source emerges.  Other 
developing countries, including Brazil and South Africa, will soon face the same WTO 
and TRIPS compliance issues currently faced by India.96  However, South Africa, which 
also has a large AIDS epidemic, may be more willing to use compulsory licensing.  
China, in contrast, who has only recently joined the WTO, has more time to amend its 
patent laws to comply with TRIPS.97  Conceivably, China could pick up where India left 
off until full compliance with TRIPS is required.  However, this would present little more 
than a stop-gap measure.  African countries could manufacture the drugs themselves, but 
 
94 However, non-enforcement of patent rights is a violation of the TRIPS agreement.  This could lead to 
dispute cases brought against the Indian government. 
95 Lately, U.S. pharmaceutical companies have been backing off from suing countries for using 
compulsory licenses because of ill-will and political pressure.  See Sherman & Oakley, supra note 8. 
96 See id. 
97 See Peng Jiang, Comment, Fighting the Aids Epidemic: China’s Options Under the WTO TRIPS 
Agreement, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 223 (2002). 
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the countries most in need of the drugs also lack the infrastructure and capital to create a 
highly technical industry. 
¶48 Brazil has repeatedly used the threat of compulsory licensing to negotiate lower 
prices for drugs with pharmaceutical companies.98  Although this could be a valuable tool 
for African countries, most of the countries lack the resources to make the threat credible.  
However, threatening to use a compulsory license to import generic AIDS drugs may be 
an effective means of negotiating lower prices with Western pharmaceutical companies.  
One important caveat is that the drugs’ production costs are both more than an average 
African country can afford and more than the price charged by Indian pharmaceutical 
companies. 
¶49 Another potential solution is for generic drug companies in India to continue 
making drugs for specific African countries by obtaining licensing from patent holders at 
a reduced cost.  This type of arrangement would significantly reduce the costs of the 
drugs because Indian pharmaceutical companies are able to access a cheaper labor force 
and would not need to acquire the needed manufacturing technologies.  Western 
pharmaceuticals could license their patented drugs to an Indian generic company as part 
of a public relations campaign to create access for Africans to AIDS drugs.   
¶50 One problem with this solution is that multiple companies own the patents for 
AIDS drugs.  To make the drug cocktail necessary for AIDS treatment, Indian generic 
companies would need licenses from many companies.  Further, Western pharmaceutical 
companies may be hesitant to license their patents for little to no cost because it creates a 
precedent or because it would create another supply for their drug.  Consumers in the 
lucrative U.S. market may use the AIDS drugs as an example in the face of an epidemic 
or threat to health, like anthrax or avian flu.  In addition, Western pharmaceutical 
companies may fear importation into the West from the Indian generic companies.99  
However, if the hurdles could be overcome, this plan would ensure a steady supply to 
Africa. 
¶51 Another possible outcome is that there are no new drugs available for poor Africans 
with AIDS, a possibility that entails a further deterioration of the African situation.  
However, the AIDS crisis is well known by most Westerners, and such a scenario would 
likely prompt both public outcry and a response by foreign aid organizations.  In addition, 
Western pharmaceutical companies already have been increasing their help to African 
countries by providing AIDS drugs at reduced or no cost,100 a response partially 
precipitated by the availability of generic drugs produced in India.101  However, no matter 
how generous Western pharmaceutical companies may be, high production costs and 
little or no return will threaten the sustainability of these programs.    102
 
98 Roll out, Roll Out: AIDS in Brazil, ECONOMIST, July 28, 2005, available at 
http://www.economist.com/research/articlesBySubject/displayStory.cfm?story_ID=4221475&subjectid=34
8867. 
99 The U.S. already has a problem with this because people in the U.S. are importing drugs from Canada 
at a significantly lower price.  Allowing India to produce drugs may create another supplier for these 
imports. 
100 Stephanie A. Barbosa, Note, Implementation of the Doha Declaration: Its Impact on American 
Pharmaceuticals, 36 RUTGERS L. J. 205, 243 (2004). 
101 See Global, supra note 29; Sherman & Oakley, supra note 8, at 382-84 (stating the price reductions 
offered by Western pharmaceutical companies after Cipla, an Indian company, offered to sell drugs to 
South Africa at a substantial discount). 
102 Furthermore, in the U.S., pharmaceutical companies are besieged with calls to reduce prices 
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¶52 Even if Western pharmaceutical companies continue to offer price reductions on 
AIDS drugs, many African countries may still be unable to afford them; however, Indian 
companies could provide drugs below even the discounted Western rates and within 
reach of African countries.103  Furthermore, without the combination of a drug cocktail 
into one pill, there is an increased chance of the patient developing resistance to AIDS 
drugs because of the difficulty in maintaining the drug schedule.  104
¶53 Finally, much hope rests on an AIDS vaccine.  Although this would be the best 
solution for the AIDS epidemic, it does not exist today.105  Hopefully, if a vaccine were to 
be developed, it would be widely available to sub-Saharan Africans.  A treatment that has 
the potential to protect so many at-risk people is invaluable, but it should be produced 
inexpensively so that African countries have a chance of obtaining it. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
¶54 The potential for profits in selling AIDS drugs to Africa is minimal for Western 
pharmaceutical companies.  The ideal solution to the lack of inexpensive AIDS drugs in 
Africa would be for Western patent owners to license their drugs to Indian generic drug 
manufacturers for specific countries in Africa that are extremely poor and lack the ability 
to work through the WTO.  Indian companies can produce drugs more cheaply than 
Western patent owners because of lower labor costs and the ability to combine the drugs 
without fearing a suit for violating patents.  The Indian government also does not fear 
dispute cases being brought against it in the WTO.  This solution seems unlikely because 
of the amount of negotiation required between Indian pharmaceutical companies and the 
many Western ones that hold the patents on the various AIDS drugs. 
¶55 Therefore, the Indian government should work closely with African countries and 
the WTO to use compulsory licensing to produce future AIDS drugs.  The process to do 
this is both in TRIPS and the amended Indian Patents Act.  The only obstacle is the 
incentive for the Indian government and pharmaceutical companies to continue to 
produce generic AIDS drugs. 
 
domestically.  Some states are trying to import drugs from other countries. 
103 Sherman & Oakley, supra note 8, at 384. 
104 Baker, supra note 30, at 615. 
105 There are a few vaccines in various clinical phases of trial, but it is not known when a finished 
product will be available.  See Sherman& Oakley, supra note 8. 
   151
